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Evaluating the success of ad/udicative tribunals is an important but elusive
undertaking. Adjudicative tribunals are created by governments and given
statutory authorit by legislatures Jr a host of reasons. These reasons may and
often do include legal aspects, policy aspects and partisan aipectis. While such
tribunals are increasingy being asked by governments to be accountable, too
often this devolves into publishing statistics on their caseload, dispositions,
budgets and staffing. We are interested in a different and more basic question
- are these tribunals successful? How do we know, for example, whether the
remedies ordered by a tribunal actually do advance the purposes for which it
was created? Can the success of an adfudicative tribunal be subject to
meaningful empirical validation? While issues of evaluation and accountability
cut across national andjurisdic'tioala boundaries, the authors argue that this
t)pe of question can only be addressed empirically, by actualy looking to the
practice of a particular board or boards, in the context of a particular statute
or statutes, and in particularjurisdictions at particular times. Such accounts
can and should Jbrm the basis for comparative study. Only through
comparative study can the value and limitations of particular methodologies
become apparent. This stud) takes as its case stud the role of ad/udicative
triunals in the health system. The authors draw primarily fom Canadian
triunal experience, though examples from other juisdictions are used to
demonstrate the potential of empirical evaluation. The authors discuss the
relative dearth of empirical stud' in administrative law and argue that it ought
to be the focus of the discussion on accountability in administrative justice.
Evaluer le succes de tribunaux qui tranchent des litiges est une entreprise
importante ma difficile a effectuer. Les tribunaux qui tranchent des lit/ges
sont crids par des gouvernements et dotes de pouvoir legal par des legislatures
pour une multitude de raisons. Ces raisons peuvent inclure des aspects legaux,
des aspects lies a despolitiques et des aspects partisans ce qui est souvent le cas.
Quoique les gouvernements demandent de plus en plus a de tels tribunaux de
This paper was originally prepared for the Sixth Administrative Law Discussion Forum, Quebec City,
May 25-26, 2010. The analysis paper builds on "Evaluating the Impact of Remedial Authority:
Adjudicativ cTribunals in the Health Sector," which was presented at the CLI) Conference, "Taking
Remedies Seriously," October 30, 2009. We have also benefited from the discussion arising from the
Workshop on the Impact of Health Tribunals that was hcld at the Univ ersity of Toronto's Faculty of
Law on 28 May 2009 and funded by the Canadian Institutes of lealth Research.
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rendre compte, trop souvent, ceci se reduit a la publication de statistiques sur le
nombre de cas traites, leurs dispositions, les budgets et le personnel Une
question diffrente et plus fondamentale nous intresse - ces tribunaux
reussissent-ils? Comment savons-nous, par exemple, si les recours ordonnis par
un tribunal font en fait avancer les objectifs pour lesquels il a ete cree? Le
succs d'un tribunal qi tranche des litiges peut-il faire l'objet de validation
empirique sign/ian.te? Quoique les questions d'valuation et du devoir de
rendre compte traversent des fontidres entre nations et champs de competence,
les auteurs soutiennent que ce genre de question ne peut itre trait
qu 'empiriquement, en examinant en Jait les pratiques d'un conseil ou de
conseils particuliers, dans le contexte d'une loi ou de lois particulieres et dans
des ipheres de competence particulieres a des moments particuliers. De tels
comptes rendus peuve1t et devraient constituer la base d'itude comparative.
Seule l'iude comparative peut faire ressortir la valeur et es limites d'uIne
meithodoogie partili/ire. L'itude de cas cloisie pour la prisen!te 't1ude est le
rdle de tribunaux qui tranchent des litzges dans le systeme de sant. Les
auteurspuisent surtout dans l'experience de tribunaux canadiens, quoique des
exempes tirs d'autres territoires de competence solent utilises pour demontrer
le potentiel de l'evaluation empirique. Les auteurs discutent de la penurie
relative d'etude empiriquie dans le domaine du droit administrattj et
soutiennenIt que ia deyrait etre le point central de la discussion du devoir de
rendre compte dans le domaine de lajustice administrative.
I. INTRODUCTION
Evaluating the success of adjudicative tribunals, like accountability itself, is an
important but elusive undertaking. Adjudicative tribunals are created by governments
and given statutory authority by legislatures for a host of reasons. These reasons may
and often do include legal aspects, policy aspects and partisan aspects. While such
tribunals are increasingly being asked by governments to be accountable, too often
this devolves into publishing statistics on their caseload, dispositions, budgets and
staffing. We are interested in a different and more basic question - are these tribunals
successful? How do we know, for example, whether the remedies ordered by a
tribunal actually do advance the purposes for which it was created? Can the success
of an adjudicative tribunal be subject to meaningful empirical validation? This is the
question we attempt to explore.
While issues of evaluation and accountability cut across national and jurisdictional
boundaries, we believe this question can only be addressed by looking to the practice
of a particular board or boards, in the context of a particular statute or statutes, and in
particular jurisdictions. Such accounts can (and, in our view, should) then form the
basis for comparative study. Only through comparative study can the value and
limitations of particular methodologies become apparent.
1 See for e.g. the paper presented by Iaveme Jacobs on the new Ontario tribunal legislation for the
Administrative Lawx Discussion Forum (Quebec City) (May 25-26, 2010), "A Wavering Comrnmitrnent?
Administrative Independence and Collaborative Gov ernance in Ontario's Adjudicativ Tribunals
'Accountability Legislation" (2010) 26:2 Windsor YB Access just.
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This study takes as its case study the role of adjudicative tribunals in the health
system, but the concern for evaluation could be applied just as easily to a variety of
administrative, policy or operational spheres. While we draw primarily from Canadian
tribunal experience, the literature in this field is primarily American, British and
Australian. Not only does this literature derive from several jurisdictions, it also is as
likely to arise from sociologists, political scientists and health policy experts as from
lawyers and legal scholars. Our hope is that this brief analysis stimulates discussion
across both academic and national boundaries, and specifically within the
administrative law community.
Adjudicative tribunals were established in order to play an important role in the
health sector, yet their actual influence as part of the health system remains largely
unknown. Most evaluations of their work have focused on internal measures of
accountability and independence rather than external indicators of societal impact.
When their effectiveness is examined, evaluators tend to utilize anecdotes from
various experts and stakeholders rather than rigorous empirical data. As efforts to
reform health systems continue both within Canada and internationally, it will be
increasingly important to understand the benefits, costs and implications of
adjudicative tribunals for providers and consumers of health care services as well as
the institutional structures on which they rely.
In this context, empirical evaluations represent an opportunity to inform
policyrmaking through better understanding the impact of adjudicative tribunals on
the health system. Empirical research includes quantitative and qualitative
investigations on the effects of tribunal processes and decision-making on economic,
social or health outcomes.' Empirical study designs range from experimental (e.g.,
randomized controlled trials, interrupted time-series studies, etc.) to observational
(e.g., cohort, case-control and cross-sectional studies), with data often gathered from
surveys, interviews, focus groups, statistical inventories, performance data or
documentary analyses.
Empirical research certainly is not new to the health sphere but it is less common
in adjudicative settings and rarer still in the context of administrative justice. That
said, interest in empirical research in this aspect of the health system is on the rise. In
addition to these general challenges faced by all empirical legal researchers, any
attempt to evaluate the impact of a health-related adjudicative tribunal faces
additional hurdles. Not only has such an assessment never before been
comprehensively undertaken, but the most suitable research methodology to do so
remains highly elusive. Much of empirical health research, for example, relates to
patient outcomes and the costs associated with achieving these outcomes. In the
setting of adjudicative tribunals, these metrics may not apply. A proceeding before a
health tribunal may take place after the outcome for the patient already has occurred,
2 Adjudicative tribunals may be defined in a number of w ays. This category could include: (1) any
administrative body engaged in adjudication, including regulatory bodies whose principle function is
policymaking but who also engagc in adjudication; (2) both administrativc and judicial bodies which
engage in adjudication; or (3) only those bodies whose primary or only function is adjudication. R.
Ellis, Executie Branch frti Canada' ' fficial Courts"(Ph.D. Dissertation, Osgoodc Hall Law School,
York University, 2009) [unpublished] at 77.
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or at a time when the outcome is unlikely to have any impact on patient outcome. For
this reason, the tribunals in fact may impose additional costs on the health system
without directly yielding improved health outcomes. While those additional costs may
well lead to better practices and procedures on the part of other actors in the health
system (e.g., regulatory colleges, insurance plans, hospitals), or enhance public
confidence in the accountability of the health system, this type of benefit is indirect,
may only become apparent over time, and is inherently difficult to measure.
Distinctions in statutory mandate and the absence of clear statutory language
setting out the purposes of adjudicative tribunals may leave no final target outcomes
against which services can be evaluated. Further, as creatures of statute that serve
quasi-judicial functions, adjudicative tribunals sit at the intersection of the legal and
health worlds. These tribunals operate within these two paradigms - a dichotomy of
process and outcomes - whose goals may sometimes diverge. Indeed, these
administrative bodies are expected to preserve the legal focus on process, fairness and
individual-level dispute resolution while at the same time working to improve health-
related outcomes by enhancing the overall effectiveness of the health system.' The
tension between a process and a substance based mandate presents distinct challenges
for empirical evaluation. The complex co-dependence and interconnectedness of
these tribunals with the health system's constituent elements ensure that simple
appraisal techniques cannot be effectively utilized. To the extent that adjudicative
tribunals have an impact on the health system, it is likely to be linked to a host of
other variables. The fact that evaluation is not easy, however, does not detract from
its importance.
Despite these benefits, the evaluation and accountability of adjudicative tribunals
is one of the least scrutinized areas of administrative law.' The topic necessarily
engages the issue of administrative independence, the statutory environment within
which all adjudicative tribunals operate, the policy priorities of government which
fund tribunals, the complexity of the health system, and the role of the court in
supervising health-related adjudicative tribunals through the mechanisms of judicial
review. Evaluating impact in the health sector is also necessarily a contextual
exercise. As Peter Cane observed in the administrative law context, "the impact of
judicial review needs to be studied in a contextualised way by reference to judicial
review's objectives and functions. Also, it should not be assumed that, when we
discuss the impact of judicial review, we are all talking about impact of the same thing
or, at least, of a single institution with a single set of objectives and functions." A
similar approach is necessary for health-related adjudicative tribunals but has never
been systematically followed.
\While this process-outcomes dichotomy bctxeecn the lcgal and health worlds is certainly cvident w\hcn
comparing their respective rescarch literature, it is important to recognize that both types of work are
conducted within both realms. Mfello and Zeiler, ibid. for example, highlight several socio-legal studies
that gathered outcomc-rclated data, and health researchers frequently address questions of othics and
resource allocation that are more procedural in nature.
6 See the discussion of the study of tribunals in Peter Cane, Adin tati Trna and Adnaton
(London: T art, 2009), ch. 1
Ibid M. Sunkin, "Conceptual lssues m Rescathing the Impact of Judicial Rcview on Government
Bureaucracies" in N. Hertogh & S. Halliday, eds, Judiial Ree and Burearat Ipact: International and
Interdiablinary Perectie (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 204) 43.
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This paper aims to explore the context, challenges and opportunities for
empirically evaluating the impact of adjudicative tribunals in the health sector. First,
we discuss the purpose, function and importance of these bodies within the health
system, including their statutory mandates and policy goals. Second, we examine the
various ways in which their performance could potentially be assessed and will justify
why there is a need to develop empirical approaches for the assessment of
adjudicative decision-making. Third, we identify the barriers to evaluating the impact
of adjudicative tribunals. Finally, based on this analysis, we explore the path forward
for the empirical assessment of adjudicative decision -making.
The focus of this analysis is on Ontario's two adjudicative health tribunals in
Canada, the Ontario Health Professions Appeal and Review Board [HPARB] and the
Health Services Appeal and Review Board [HSARB]. Both HPARB and HSARB
have statutory mandates to review important health decisions that intimately affect
the lives of their constituents. Using these two bodies as case studies for exploring
the context, challenges and opportunities for evaluating adjudicative tribunals may
enrich our understanding of administrative tribunals throughout other sectors as well.
II. THE CONTEXT OF ADJUDICATIVE TRIBUNALS IN THE HEALTH
SECTOR
Adjudicative tribunals are administrative bodies that are created by statutes and
exercise delegated decision-making powers of the executive branch for the purposes
of achieving certain policy goals. They serve as an oversight mechanism for lower-
level decision-makers and apply legal and normative principles to resolve disputes
between conflicting parties. They are independent - operating at arm's-length from
the government - and serve quasi-judicial functions otherwise fulfilled by the formal
judicial syTstem. This independence, however, also has limits; their members are
appointed by the executive branch of government (in the case of HPARB and
HSARB, the power of appointment is effectively in the hands of the Minister of
Health, in consultation with the Chair of the Boards) which also sets their staffing
allowances and budgets. Their decisions, while often final, must be authorized by
their enabling statute and are subject to judicial review by the courts.
In the health sector, adjudicative tribunals may be involved with resolving
disputes regarding medical malpractice claims, insurance coverage for health care
services, determination of mental capacity, licensing decisions for health care facilities,
and patient safety procedures. They serve as an oversight and accountability
mechanism for lower-level health decision-makers and ensure they follow appropriate
processes and act according to their respective statutory mandates. They aim to boost
public confidence in the credibility of decision-making within the health system,
facilitate better and more consistent decisions, and reduce the risk of errors that in
this context can have deadly consequences. Finally, they promote fairness and justice
within health care, militate against self-interest and corruption, and provide
opportunities to address wrongs through redress.
The HPARB, for example, is an integral part of Ontario's self regulating health
professional system. It helps to ensure that the health professions are regulated in the
public interest, that appropriate standards of practice are created and maintained, that
patients have access to the health professional of their choice, and that they are
treated with respect and sensitivity by health professionals. HPARB was established
Vol. 28(2) 347
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as a response to two related phenomena in the early 1970's: first, the
recommendation arising out of the Report by the Honourable James Chalmers
McRuer's Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights' [McRuer Report] which
emphasized the need for public interest oversight over self-regulating professional
bodies; and second, the Committee on the Healing Arts tabled by the government on
April 28, 1970' [Healing Arts Report], which also emphasized the primacy of public
interest regulation of health professionals. Under the Province of Ontario's Regulated
Health Professions Act [RHPA] people may appeal the decision of a self regulated
health professional College to not pursue a disciplinary proceeding before the
HPARB." If the appropriate statutory processes were not followed by the relevant
College, then the Board is empowered to send the matter back to the college for
reconsideration. HPARB also hears appeals from adverse decisions by the colleges in
relation to registration requests. The remedies available to HPARB panels focus on
the regulated Colleges, as opposed to the parties. For example, if a complaint was
dismissed and an HPARB panel finds that the investigation was inadequate or the
decision to dismiss the complaint was unreasonable, the complaint usually will be sent
back to the College to reconsider its reasons or investigate the complaint further.
Recommendations to the College may also be provided where the issues raised on a
complaint review are more systemic. Parties, however, are not entitled to damages, or
to an apology, or to any other individual remedy they may seek or to which they may
feel entitled. For this reason, it is not uncommon to find parties who both seek a
complaint review from HPARB and simultaneously pursue civil remedies against
health professionals or health facilities arising from the same factual circumstances.
The HSARB similarly is a part-time Board providing oversight for the decisions
of various actors within the health system. Its broad jurisdiction arises from fourteen
different statutes and includes reviewing decisions concerning payment for health
care services under the Ontario Health Insurance Plan [OHIP], eligibility for housing
in long-term care facilities, licensing of nursing homes and other independent health
facilities, and the decisions of public health officials." By contrast, HSARB provides
individual remedies, ordering, for example, that OHIP fund out-of country medical
services where the statutory test is met.
Both HPARB and HSARB have a full-time Chair, and a roster of part-time
members, some of whom have legal training (and, in the case of HSARB, legal or
medical training) and some who do not. Both Boards have been held to be expert
8 Noyal Commission Inquiry into Ciil ights, (Toronto: Queen's Printer, Ontario, 1968) (Commissioner:
HonourablkJ.C.IcRucr).
9 Report of the Commillee on the Healing Ars, (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1970) (Chair: 1. R. Dowie)
to Regulated Health Pr/esoions At 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 18, s. 3. Also see R. Steinecke. A Complete Guide ao
the Regulated Healh Profession Ac, looseleaf. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2000). The RHPA is one of
scycral statutes administered by HP\RB.
11 C. Pitfield & .M. Flood, "Section 7'Safety Valves': Appealing Wait Times Within a One-Tier
System" in C.L Flood, K. Roach & L. Sossin, eds, Aceu ao Care, Acceu ojusfice:The Lal ebale
Oer Ptivate Iealth Insurance in Canada (Toronto: Uni crsity of Toronto Press, 2005) 477.
12 Since 2008, the same individual has served as Chair of both Boards.
13 HP\RB has three full time Vice Chairs and approximately 35 part-time members. HSARB has
approximately 25 part-time members. Of these, approximately 10 part-time members are cross-
appointed to both Boards.
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bodies by reviewing Courts which warrant deference. Their substantive decisions may
only be overturned on judicial review to a court if found to be "unreasonable."1
As indicated above, a key aspect of evaluating tribunals created by statute is to
assess whether a tribunal is fulfilling its statutory objective(s). This may be especially
challenging, for example, if the specific goals of the televant tribunal are diffuse and
ambiguous in their enabling legislation. Ontario's RHPA, for example, does not detail
the purposes of the Board, so this must be inferred from the powers and authority it
has been provided. For example, as indicated above, HPARB has the power to review
decisions of regulated health colleges, not to refer complaints to discipline on
grounds of the reasonableness of the college's decision and the adequacy of the
college's investigation." HPARB has broader jurisdiction to review decisions by
Colleges to deny registration to applicants." Thus, while HPARB's role is generally to
ensure public interest accountability over decision-making by regulated health
Colleges, HPARB's role in reviewing complaints suggests a different purpose, and a
more deferential standard of review, than its role in reviewing denials of registration.
Evaluation needs to be responsive to these differences of statutory mandate and
remedial discretion.
III. THE CONTEXT FOR EVALUATING ADJUDICATIVE TRIBUNALS
Assessing the work of these adjudicative tribunals, as suggested above, is an
inherently complex enterprise. However, evaluations can be thought of and
categorized according to their orientation and methodology.
In terms of orientation, evaluations of tribunals can be focused on how they
function or what impact they have. The former would analyze the internal operations
of a tribunal while the latter would assess the body's external effects on a specified
population. Procedural analyses are important to promote coherent internal
management structures, good governance, accountability, efficiency and efficacy.
External impact evaluations, on the other hand, represent a way to assess the real-
world effectiveness of the adjudicative tribunal, its impact on others within the health
care system, and the benefits (or consequences) that this impact yields. Such studies
can determine whether or not these bodies support and/or enhance the functioning
of various health system institutions and decision-makers and whether or not thev
ultimately influence service provision, access to justice in the health sector, and health
outcomes. External impact evaluations require expertise and independence - they are
not traditionally conducted by auditors,' ombudsmen" or internal staff."
14 See, with respect to HPA\RB, Boros /o. Beadle (2007), 71 Admin LR (4th) 225, and with respect to
ITSARB, F/oa . Onaioi (Health Insurance Plan, General Manager) 2008 ONCA 538.
15 See s. 29(2) of the Ila Prqfessions Poedure Code, Schedule 2 to the RIIPA.
16 See s. 22(1) of the Ila Prfessions Poedure Code, Schedule 2 to the RIPA.
17 Ontario, Office of the Auditor-Gcncral (I. McCartr), AnnualRport2008 (Toronto: Queen's Printer
for Ontario, 2008) online: Gov crnmcnt of Ontaio <http://www.auditor.on.ca/cn/reports-cn/cn-
08/ar_enO8.pdf>).
18 Ontario, Office of the Ombudsman, Ombud1man Ontao: AnIna lRport 2007-2008, (Chair: A. Marim)
online: Ombudsman Ontario <http://www.ombuds-man.on.ca/media/18971/ar08_ eng.pdf>.
19 Ontario, Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council, IIPR/1C-AnnualeportApril 1, 2007-
March 31, 2008. Online: HPRAC <http://www\w.h-p-r-a-c.org/cn/reports/rcsourccs/H-P-R-A-C-
Annuial-Report-2007-2008.pdf>.
Vol. 28(2) 349
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A review of several evaluations of administrative bodies highlights that they tend
to focus on issues related to internal operations rather than external impact. The
recent report of the Ontario Security Commission's Fairness Committee, for
example, examined whether the agency's internal governance structure created a
perception or reality of bias in its adjudicative responsibilities'. The United
Kingdom's National Audit Office similarly reviewed the procedures used by its
Department of Work and Pensions to medically assess incapacity and disability' and
to hear appeals of social security benefit decisions." Some reviews examine particular
problems that had previously been identified" while others focus on users'
satisfaction with a tribunal's provision of services.
Several assessment efforts have even focused on the internal operations of
multiple tribunals or a jurisdiction's entire tribunal system, including the report of
Ontario's Agency Reform Commission,2 the UK's Leggatt Review of Tribunals,2' and
the report of the UK's former Council on Tribunals . Academic publications similarly
20 Ontario, Ontario Securitics Commission Report ofthe Fairness Committee toDavidA. Brown,Q.Co, Chair/o
the Ontai Secuities Commission, 2004 (authors, C.-A. Osborne, D.J. Mullan, and B. Finlay). Online:
OSC<http://-w.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Five-Year-Review/f yr 2004-0818 fairness
commicttc.pdf>.[ Osborne Report]
21 United Kingdom, National Audit Office, Progress in Improving the Medical Assessment of
Incapacity and Disability Benefits: Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General. TIC 1141, Session
2002-2003, 17/10/2003. (London: Stationcry Office, 2003) online: NAO <http://www\\\w.nao. org.
uk/publications/ nao_reports/02-03/0203-1141.pdf> [NAO Pronss].
22 United Kingdom, National Audit Office, Gettiq It Riho Puttiq It Roht Improing Deaion-Afaking and
Appeals in Soi 'Seit Be/t: HC / 112, 5euion 2002-2003, 07 11/2003. (London: Stationery
Office, 2003). Online: NAO <http://wwx.nao.org.uk/publications/nao reports/02-03/020(31142
.pdf> [NAO, Geli it Rght].
23 Ontario, Society of Ontario Adjudicators and Regulators, TowadMaianing and Improin" the Qualiy
of Adudicaion: SOAR Recommendaions jor Pelformane Managemen in Onaio' Adinis justice
Trnal. (Toronto: Society of Ontario Adjudicators and Regulators, 1995), online: SOAR
<http://-wTv.soar.on.ca/soar-perf man.htm> [SOAR Recommendations]; S. Blumenthal & S.
Wcsscly, The Patten oDelayin Al ntalle Rei en Tribuonal. (London: Stationcry Office, 1993); S.
Blumenthal & S. Wessely, "The Pattern of Delays in Mental Tealth Review Tribunals" (1994) 18
Pychiatriculletin 400. Oninc: Thc Psychiatrist <http://pb.rcpsych.org/cgi/rcprint/18/7/398.pdf>.
24 J. Aston, D. T ill & N.D. Tackey, The I e of Caimantr in ace Dinatio Imploment Tribunal
Caies. rmploKment Relatios Reseanh Series, No. 5. (London: UK Department ofTrade and Industry,
2006) online: DTI <http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/filc27818.pdf>;Employmcnt Tribunals Service,
/ mploment Tribunals Senice User Sun 2005 (london: Employment Tribunals Service, 2005);
Confederation of British Industry, A Matter oq Confidence: Rertonng Faith in Employment Tribunair
(london: Confederation of British Industry, 2005). Online: CBI <http://-w.c-b- i.org.uk/n-d-b-
s/Press.nsf/O/33f-9830cd-75f765b-8025708-8005-23621/$ILEL/tribunals-Brif-CBI.pdf>; M.P.
Carscallen, W.K. Gray & J.G. Pink, Regulatory BurdenTask Korce: Report lo the Ontaio Seuities
Commission (Toronto: Ontario Securitics Commission, 2003) online: OSC <http://www.o-s- c.gov.
on.ca/ About/ Govemance/Accountabilit /ga_20031212_rbtf rpt.pdf>.
25 Ontario, Agency Reform Commission on Ontario's Regulatory and Adjudicative Agcncies (G.
Guzzo, J. Baird, B. Grimmctt, G. Martiniuk& J. Flaherty) Everyl Jurtice: Report ooth Aeny Reform
Commissioon Ontario'i Regulatory and Adudicat Aeni. (Toronto: Govemiment of Ontaio, 1998).
Online: Council of Canadian AdministraiN Tribunals <http://wx.ccat- ctac.org/ doxnloads/
1998_Guzzo-report.pdf> [Guzzo Report].
26 A. LCggatt, Tr iunat or ser: One System, One Senice (London: UK Department for Constitutional
Affairs, 2001) online: <http://-w.tribunals-review.org.uk/index.htm>.
27 M. Adlct & J. Gulland, Tribunal [T rer' Eperiences, Perceptions and Expectaions: A Literature Reiew




appear to focus on the internal operations of tribunals across various topics -
whether they regulate securities," medical malpractice claims," privacy,- pensions," or
determinations of medical incapacity" - and often examine users' experience." While
not a single governmental evaluation could be found that focused on the external
impact of adjudicative tribunals, at least one academic publication discusses the
potential benefits that administrative "health courts" (which resolve malpractice
claims) can have on patient safety.
In terms of methodology, assessments of tribunals can either be conducted
through expert reviews or empirical evaluations. The first approach would take
advantage of the personal experiences and perspective of an investigator (usually
based on some combination of interviews and analysis of primary data and secondary
literature) while the second approach attempts to attain more objective and
generalizable data. Expert reviews often focus on identifying structural problems and
recommending possible ways to overcome them. This approach is also more likely to
have fewer costs and a faster completion timeline. Empirical evaluations of tribunals,
by contrast, aspire to scientific methods and can be used to, inter alia, quantitatively or
qualitatively assess impact, identify the factors that determine their successful
operations, and track perceptions of them over time. These two methodological
approaches cannot be completely dichotomized as experts often utilize empirical
methods and even the most scientifically rigorous and objective evaluations must be
interpreted by individuals through the lens of their expertise.
Reviews of adjudicative tribunals have been conducted using both expert and
empirical methodologies. Prominent observers, academics and practitioners, for
28 S. Rousscau, The Quibec E perience nith an Inep en nA tdminitrative Tribunal Seiali ed in Secuities: A
Stud ofthe uirau de dicion e/ de liion en ialem mob/lrs (Ottawa: Expert Panel on Securities
Regulation, 2008) online: Groupc Expcrts<http://wwwx.xgroupc-expcrts.ca/cng/rcports/rcscarch
-studies/quebec-independent-adjudicative-tribunal-rousseau.php>; P. Mover, "The Regulation of
Corporate Law by Securitics Regulators: A Comparison of Ontario and the United States" (1997) 55
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29 G. Siegal, M.M. Mello & D.M. Studdcrt, "Adjudicating Scycre Birth Injury Chims in Florida and
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Am] L & Mcd 489.Onhnc: Harvard School of Public Health < http://wwx.hsph.harvard.cdu
/faculty/michelle-mello/Files/Fl,-VA PDF.pdf>.
30 L. J acobs. "Rconciing Tribunal Jndependence and Expertise -- Empirical Obscr ations" (Presented
at The Future of Administrativ cJustice Symposium, Univcrsity of Toronto, 18 January 2008)
online: University of Toronto Faculty of Law <http://uwwy.law.utoronto.ca/ documents/
confcrcnccs/adminjusticc08 Jacobs.pdf>.
31 L. Sossin, "The Effectiveness and Efficiency of Pension Regulation in Ontario and in Comparative
Perspective" (Toronto: Expert Commission on Pensions, 2007) online: Pension Review
<http://wwx,.pcnsion-rcvicw.on.ca/cnglish/sunmarics/8Sossin.html>.
32 M. Dolan, R. Gibb & P. Coorey, "Mental Ilealth Review Tribunals: A Survey of Special Hospital
Patients' Opinions" (1999) 10 Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 264; C. Bradle, M. Marshall & D.
Gath. "Why Do So Few Patients Appcal Aginst Detention Undtr the Mental Health Act?"(1995)
310 Brit Med J 364. Online: BMJ <http://-wTv.b-m-j.com/cgi/content/full/310/6976/364>; J.
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Clarendon Press, 1989).
3 H. Genn, B. Lever, L. Gray, and National Centre for Social Rescarch, Triuna forD ie I err, 2006
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example, have assessed various tribunals' organizational structures", efficiency,"
accessibility,' independence," performance standards" and overall effectiveness.
Other reviews feature empirical elements such as (1) surveys that capture the
perceived quality of services offered," stakeholder attitudes towards the tribunal,' and
the functioning of a certain process;' (2) interviews that probe users' experiences with
the tribunal,' its perceived impartiality," and the effectiveness of a particular
procedure;' and (3) performance data and documentary analyTses for examining key
features of a tribunal's caseload' and arrangements for how it makes appeal
decisions."
The challenge in evaluating health-related adjudicative tribunals, therefore, seems
to lie at the intersection of orientation and methodology. Assessments of adjudicative
tribunals have focused on both process and impact, and have been conducted using
both expert reviews and empirical methods, yet not a single review could be found
that empirically evaluated the external impact of an adjudicative tribunal, despite
extensive searching. While this lack of research may indicate that such undertaking
are not important, interesting or possible, the evidence suggests otherwise: the need
for external impact evaluations is evident" and such evaluations have been conducted
3 Osborne Report, supra note 20; Moyer, supra note 28.
36 Carscallcn, Gray & Pink, supa note 24.
Adler & Gulland, sra note 27.
38 Rousseau, supra note 28.
3 SOAR Recommendations, supra note 23.
Leggattsupra note 26; Guzzo Report, supra note 25; Sossin, iupra note 31; 'Mlello elal supra note 34.
41 Employmcnt ribunals Scrvice, supra note 24.
42 Confederation of British industry, A Matter of Confidence: Rartonng Faith in Employment Tribunair
(london: Confederation of British Industry, 2005) Online: CBT <http://-ww\.c-b- i.org.uk/
ndbs/Prcss.nsf/0/33f9830cd75f765b8(025708800523621/$FILE/Tribunals Brief - CBI.pdf>.
4 P. 1 atreille, J..A. Iatreille & K.G. Knight. HFdingN from he 1998 Suny of R prsetat i i lyment
T ibunal Ca / /mploymet Relon Rs earc i V es, No. 35. (london: UK Department of Trade and
Industry, 2004) oninc: BERR <http://wxw\.bcrr.gov.uk/filcs/filc11453.pdf>); P. Latrcillc, J.A.
Latreille & K.G. Knight "Making a Difference? Legal Representation in Employment Tribunal
Cases: Evidence from a Survey of Representatives" (2005) 34 Indus. L. J. 308.
4 Aston, T fill, & Tackey, supra note 24.
45 Jacobs, supa note 30.
46 Sicgal, Nielo & Studdcrt, supra note 29; NAO Proge r, supa note 21; Bradky, Marshall & Gath, supa
note 32.
4 B. Haward, L. Peters, N. Rouss eau & K. Seeds. fid h S of imploymNt TrbuNa!
Appica ion 2003. / /loymet Rla iot R esar Series, No. 33. (London: UK Department of Trade and
Industry, 2004) Available oninc: DI <http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/filc11455.pdf>.
48 NAO, Getting it Right, supra note 2; Pea, supra note 32.
49 M. Hcrtogh & S. Halliday, cds, ficia u/Revien /Bu aucati Imput Itenana an/ Intedicnary
Perpectives (Cambridgc, UK: Cambridgc Unixversity PrEs, 2(04); Centcr for Global Dcxclopmcnt's
Evaluation Gap Working Group, IWhe Ill We Ie IarN? Improin I Je Thouh Ipact lalt.
(Washington DC: Center for Global Dcxclopment, 2J06) onlin: CGD <http://w\ww.c-g- dcv.
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with success in related settings which also involve the nexus of the health and law
sectors and beyond.'
The dearth of externally-focused empirical evaluations is not only a missed
opportunity, in our view, but may also pose a significant risk. The lack of an empirical
rationale for the benefits of a tribunal may render it vulnerable to opposition or
simply to general cost-cutting initiatives, or to pursue policy directions that
undermine rather than advance its purposes. Without this data, the Boards may lack
the baseline measures needed to track changes over time, evaluate the performance of
decision-makers and staff, and engage in longer term strategic planning. If you are
running in the dark, there is no way to know whether you are moving forward, or
further away from your destination, or simply going in circles.
Indeed, it is widely accepted that data-driven strategies are more likely to help
decision-makers achieve their goals in a cost-effective way than polices pursued in the
absence of evidence." Information gathered by health-related adjudicative tribunals
like HPARB and HSARB through empirical methods may be of particular interest to
government officials as it can demonstrate performance benchmarks and ensure
public funds are being invested and spent effectively. If reform is called for, empirical
data will be essential in identifying what needs to change. For academics, it is an
under- scrutinized sphere of administrative law and health systems functioning that is
both ripe for research and, potentially, reform.
IV. CHALLENGES FOR EMPIRICALLY EVALUATING ADJUDICATIVE
TRIBUNALS
Yet despite the tremendous benefits, empirical impact evaluations of adjudicative
tribunals are not being conducted. This absence of assessment efforts is most likely
attributable to the various challenges facing anyone who embarks on undertaking
such a project. In the context of health adjudicative tribunals, these obstacles can be
divided into three categories: (A) complexity in the health system; (B) methodological
complications; and (C) legal barriers.
A. Challenges with Complexity in the Health System
Empirically evaluating the impact of any adjudicative tribunal is a naturally
difficult enterprise as it requires the body's various effects to be isolated from the
larger social context within which it operates. This is no doubt complicated for
tribunals in every sector because their activities are usually only indirectly related to
their existential goals. This challenge, however, may be further exacerbated in the
health context due to its overwhelming complexity.
Indeed, health systems are increasingly being recognized as complex adaptive
systems that are multi-layered, non-linear and highly sophisticated. They consist of
Mfello & Zeiler, spra note 3; N. Jones el al, "Working Paper 300: Improving Impact Evaluation
Production and Usc" (London: O crscas Dcy clopmcnt Institute, 2009) online: <http://www .o-d-
i.org.uk/resources/dowx nload/3177.pdf>.
World Health Organization, World Report on Knonkdge for Better lealth (Geneva: World Health
Organization, 2004) online: WHO <http://www .who.int/r-p-c/metings/world-rcport
knowledgefor better health.pdf>; K. Chalkidou elal, Comparative Effectiveness Research and
Evidence-Bascd Health Policy: Experience from Four Countrics. 2009 87 ilbank Quaterly 339.
Online: Milbank <http://-w\v.milbank.org/quiarterly/milq_87_2-final-chalkidou.pdf>.
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countless sub-systems with immeasurable independent actors, established policies,
zealously guarded interests, entrenched professional "silos" and divergent cultures
that can all influence each another and even alter their external environments. This
web of elements, and the unpredictable interactions among them, ensures that
conventional mechanistic or "cause-effect" conceptualizations of the health system
are inaccurate and oversimplifications of its complex dynamics.
While scientific knowledge has been greatly advanced by breaking big questions
into smaller ones that can be observed, analyzed and understood through rational
deduction, this process is severely limited when the studied phenomenon or
intervention is located within a system whose constitutive parts are not independent,
constant not predictable. The fact that the health system exhibits characteristics of
distributed control, co-dependence and nesting of smaller systems within other larger
systems further aggravates this challenge and makes it difficult to fully examine
adjudicative tribunals without reference to other actors and institutions (such as
adjudicators, staff, government policymakers, regulatory colleges, relevant expert
panels, the traditional court system and the public). Isolating and attributing impact is
further problematized by the fact that health-related adjudicative tribunals serve
diverse functions according to various players within completely different contexts."
B. Challenges with Research Methodology
Yet in addition to the daunting barriers of evaluating adjudicative tribunals caused
by health system complexity, there are further methodological barriers associated with
such an undertaking. The primary challenge, as highlighted above, is that simple
research designs cannot be used to isolate adjudicative tribunals and elegantly locate
cause-effect relationships between them and their goals. But above and beyond the
various explanations illuminated by the complexity perspective is the fact that efforts
of adjudicative tribunals are only indirectly related to their goals. Indeed, health
services themselves only partially help meet their goal of improved health for people.
Any legal, regulatory or oversight "intervention" that serves to better structure these
services would be even further removed from their ultimate goals. Empirical impact
studies of such interventions must be expertly designed to account for this
complexity.
However, even if simple methods did exist to observe the relationship between
adjudicative tribunals and their goals, there is currently a lack of clear evaluative
criteria against which particular adjudicative tribunals can be measured. This is
because their goals are not easily articulated and have thus not been defined with
adequate precision - if defined at all. Desired outcome measures are consequently
absent which ensures that suitable quantitative and/or qualitative research
methodologies cannot be matched to them. This problem, however, cannot simply be
overcome by brainstorming possible goals of adjudicative tribunals. Indeed, the
existential purpose of these bodies may change and evolve over time with new
legislators, government policyrmakers, adjudicators and tribunal staff who can each
,2 B. Zimmerman, P. Plsek & C. Lindberg, Oqgewr: InsIhr j rom Complexiy Scie jor Heakh Care I aden
(Jrving, Tcxas: VHA Inc., 1998)
, P.E. P1sek & T. Greenhalgh (2001) "Complexity Science: The Challenge of Complexity in Health
Care" 323 Brit Med J 625.
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contribute towards a shift in the focus and priority of their operations over time."
Various community stakeholders may also perceive the role of a particular
adjudicative tribunal in their sector very differently depending upon their own
mandate, ideological perspective and unique vantage point. While reference to a
tribunal's enabling statute may be informative in crafting an outcome measure, it is
not always decisive. In the case of HPARB, legislative provisions suggest this body
was created to ensure effective regulation of the health professions in the public
interest," yet this goal is not easily measurable. Indeed, the ability to empirically
evaluate a complex intervention like a health-related adjudicative tribunal depends
upon having a desired outcome that is observable and testable against a null
hypothesis.
A desire to empirically "prove" cause-effect relationships between adjudicative
tribunals and a particular outcome is also complicated by the impossibility of
randomly allocating potential users of existing tribunals into groups that either receive
or do not receive their services. Randomized controlled trials - the most rigorous of
discrete empirical evaluations" - assess the effect of an intervention on a test
population in comparison to a theoretically identical population. This method,
however, requires a properly-constituted (i.e., randomized) and adequately- sized (i.e.,
large) control group with both known and unknown confounding factors evenly
distributed between them in order to isolate the impact of tribunal services and
measure it against a benchmark. Non-randomized retrospective evaluations
comparing users of tribunals to non-users (or the situation of the general public in
jurisdictions with and without comparable tribunals) may not be an ideal solution to
this challenge as this creates a situation where user-status and outcomes are measured
at the same time. This prevents efforts to control for confounding factors which in
turn extinguishes the possibility of making causal determinations.
A penultimate methodological challenge for conducting external impact
evaluations of health-related adjudicative tribunals is that there are few examples of
past efforts upon which to emulate. As previously mentioned, many empirical studies
have examined the internal processes of tribunals, but none could be found that
focused on their societal impact. This is exacerbated by the dearth of obvious
empirical data sets which can be analyTzed and from which potential evaluators can
draw." Whereas hospitals may be able to compare their patient population and its
outcomes to those from neighbouring hospitals, adjudicative tribunals are not likely
in a position to continually collect data about their past users nor compare this
information to existing data sets from the same region or other jurisdictions.
54 For example, the evolution of Ontano's Health Professions Appeal and Rcvicw Board ovcr a period
of 40 years was documented in the tribunal's formal submission to the Health Professions Regulatory
Advisory Council regarding interprofessional collaboration among health colleges and professionals.
Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, Recommendations to lealth Professions Remulato1dri oty
Council. (Toronto: Iealth Professions Appeal and Review Board, 2008). online: TTPARB
<http://wwx.hprac.org/cn/projccts/rcsources/hprac-1457May30HPAYRB.pdf>.
Reu/lated Health Pro/essio Aclt, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 18, s. 3.
,6 GRADE Working Group, "Grading Quality of Evidence and Strength Recommendations"(2004)328
Brit Med J. Available online: BMT <http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/328/7454/1490>
(accessed on 10 April 2009).
Mello & Zeiler, supra note 3.
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Finally, the identity and background of the researcher(s) evaluating the impact of
an adjudicative tribunal must also be considered. While the goal of empirical study is
to avoid bias and ideological assumptions, every researcher brings a particular matrix
of perspective, orientation, experience and values to their work. Insiders, for example,
may bring intuition and experiential judgment, while outsiders may bring
independence, fresh eyes and objectivity.
C. Legal Barriers
As institutions that function within both the health and legal systems, health-
related adjudicative tribunals must also overcome the realities of the legal sector that
may not be particularly nurturing for empirical impact evaluations. For example, legal
actors are often focused more on achieving due process, transparency and good
governance than specific societal outcomes (like improved health status which is the
goal of direct clinical health care). Excellent process in the legal world is often
thought to be the most likely way to achieve the best outcome, without much
attention to the actual substantive benefits or costs to which an excellent process
might give rise.
There is also, appropriately, a much greater concern for maintaining
independence and avoiding any apprehension of bias. Like impartiality, independence
is a common law right of procedural fairness enjoyed by parties who come before
administrative bodies in common law jurisdictions (including Canada, United States,
United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand). In Canada, independence for
adjudicative tribunals is based on the categories of judicial independence identified by
the Supreme Court of Canada in Valente v. The Queen (i.e., security of tenure, financial
independence and administrative independence over adjudicative matters)" and
applied to administrative bodies in Canadian Paf/ic Ltd. v. Mlatsqui Indian Band - albeit
in a more flexible and contextually sensitive manner.
Respecting this independence of adjudicative tribunals will naturally influence the
process and content of any evaluation in multiple ways. For example, independence
suggests that governments should refrain from evaluating tribunals' substantive
decisions lest reasonable observers apprehend that tribunals may adjust their
decision-making to align with what the government of the day perceives as
"successful." Similarly, it may also be difficult for a tribunal to establish evaluative
criteria or outcome measures for itself as this might lead a reasonable observer to
conclude that the tribunal may pursue these goals at the expense of fairness to the
parties. This concern for independence even questions the extent to which tribunals'
staff and members can be directly involved in any evaluation for fear of influencing
or interfering with their services that must remain neutral at all times. Contrary to
encouraging self evaluation as is common within the health sphere, the legal
environment may actually discourage adjudicative tribunals from assessing their own
9 Valet . Th Que (1985), 24 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (S.C.C.).
6 Canadian Pai id. la squi Indian Band (1995), 122 D.L.R. (4th) 129 (S.C.C.). It should be noted
that these standards of independence that are relevant in the adjudicative tribunal context are only a
common law right which may be displaced by statute, unlike judicial independence which is a
constitutional principle. See 0can Por Hoteli B/itih Columbia, 2001 SCC 17.
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external impact, especially since such undertakings are not explicitly part of their
statutory mandates."
Finally, as recently highlighted by the Nuffield Inquiry on Empirical Legal
Research, the legal academy also suffers from a dearth of empirical competence and
capacity to conduct such studies." While the field of empirical health law scholarship
has recently grown exponentially," it is generally accepted that current capacity is
inadequate and that it may further diminish over time. Empirical legal methodologies
are also not generally recognized to be as prestigious within the academic community
as traditional doctrinal investigations. The pervasive culture of deference to experts
and authority must further diminish the perceived value of objective empirical work
and weaken any apparent need for more rigorous research that is higher on the
hierarchy of evidence." Again, the focus on elements of process (e.g., bias and
independence) rather than impact (e.g., judicial decisions) as indicator of quality and
performance must also deter legal scholars from conducting work in this area such
that target outcomes are less likely to be assessed.
V. REASONS FOR OPTIMISM
However, despite the challenges faced by potential evaluators of adjudicative
tribunals, there is reason for optimism: each of the various identified barriers can be
overcome and have indeed been circumvented in similar evaluations. For example, as
previously mentioned, many empirical evaluations have been conducted that focus on
the internal operations of these bodies. A major literature review in 2007 highlighted
much of the work that has been conducted and published in this area." Yet in
addition to these studies, empirical evaluations have also been undertaken to assess
the external impact of similarly- functioning specialty courts that operate within the
judicial system. A systematic review of the research evidence has even been
conducted on the societal impact of at least one type of these judicial organs.'
Indeed, methodologically, there may be much to learn from external impact
evaluations of specialist courts in the judicial sector." For example, "drug courts"
have been extensively evaluated in the United States and in other jurisdictions
61 On the other hand, a study which expresses respect for the adjudicative independence of tribunals
will likely havc greater credibility and attract broadcr "buy in" than a study which is perceivcd as
inconsistent with it.
62 H. Gnn, NI. Partington & S. Wheeler, Nuffield Inqui, onEmi/icl LegaliResearh: Lamin the Real World:
Improving ourt Underrtan din g oflHow Lam Vorks: Final Reporta iaReomme ndations (London: Nufficld
Foundation,2006) Online: UCI,<http://-w.ucl.ac.uk/laws/socio-legal/empirical/docs/inquiry
rcport.pdf>.
6 Mello & Zeiler, supra note 3.
64 Genn, Partington & Wheeler, supra note 62.
65 GRADE Worlng Group, supra note 56.
66 M. Partington, E. Kitton-Darling & F. McCknaghan, Emprical Reseatrh on Tribunal AnAnotated
Reiew of Research Published betmeen 1992 and 2007 (London: AdministraiN cJustice and Tribunals
Council, 200)) Online: ATTC <http://wwx-.ajtc.gov.uk/docs/EmpiricalResearch.pdf>.
6 D.B. Wilson, 0. Mitchell & D.L. Macklnzic, "A Systematic Rcvicx of Drug Court Effects on
Recidivism" (2006) 2 journal of Experimental Criminology 459.
6 J. Plotnikoff & R. Woolfson, Reiew ofthe E ffectivenes of ealirt Court in Other furisdictions. D(A Report
Sers, No. 3/05. (London: UKDcpartmcnt for Constitutional Affairs, 2005) Online: DCAN
< http://-w.dca.gov.uk/research/2005/3_2005.pdf>.
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regarding their ability to increase treatment rates, lower criminal recidivism, and
enhance cost-effectiveness of prosecution." Domestic violence courts and community
courts have similarly been assessed for compliance, cost-effectiveness, conviction
rates and public perception, and mental health courts have been comprehensively
examined for reducing criminal violence, enhancing community safety, conserving
fiscal resources and improving clinical outcomes. However, it must be recognized
that the context within which these judicial bodies operate is very different from that
of health-related administrative tribunals. Not only are they part of the judiciary
rather than the executive branch of government, but their existential goals are usually
related to diverting complex or special cases from traditional courtrooms rather than
supporting the infrastructure of a completely different system (like that of health).
Empirically tracking desired outcomes like cost-savings and reduced reoffending rates
will naturally be easier in this context when the intervention or service is more
directly related to its goal. Yet, alternatively, it may actually be more difficult for these
judicial organs to evaluate themselves due to their strict separation from the executive
(which has the financial resources to fund such an undertaking) and the likelihood of
them to zealously guard their independence.
The possible range of empirical legal research methodologies that can be used in
evaluating health-related adjudicative tribunals may benefit from earlier studies. For
example, Mello and Zeiler describe the diversity and comparative advantages of
various empirical approaches that have been taken by scholars in the health law field
to address issues as wide-ranging as medical malpractice reform and motor safety
laws.' And on the use of randomized controlled trials, for which these two scholars
are less optimistic, Pleasence provides an account of such an undertaking in the
United Kingdom, highlights the many technical, practical and ethical barriers that
were faced, and suggests ways to overcome them in the future.-
VI. OPPORTUNITIES FOR MOVING FORWARD
There are several developments converging on the importance of evaluation.
First, there is a wave of interest in enhancing accountability both in governmental and
administrative settings. Second, and related to the first development, governments are
increasingly attracted to legislative schemes which provide for greater transparency
and oversight. In Ontario, for example, the recently enacted Adjudicative Tribunals
Accountability, Governance and Appointments Act, 2009 requires a set of prescribed
adjudicative tribunals (including HPARB and HSARB) to publish a set of "public
accountability documents" which include a mandate and mission statement, a public
consultation policy, a service standard policy, an ethics plan, and a member
69 Wilson, Mitchell & Mackenzic, supra note 67; United States Govcrnmnt Accountabihty Office, Adult
Dru Court.: Eidence Int Re diirm Reductio;n and M ixedRult for Other Outcomes (Washington DC:
United States Govermnent AccountabilityOfflice,2005) online: G.AO<http://www.gao.gov/
ncw.items/d05219.pdf>; B.L. Green etal, "Building the Evidence Base for Family Drug
Treatment Courts: Results from Recent Outcome Studies" (2009) 6 Irug Court Re/iew 53. Online:
NDCJ<http://ww\\w.n-d-c-i.org/sites/dcfault/files/ncdc/DCR%,2C% 20Vol.0%, 206% 2C% 0
20No%202.pdf>).
70 Mello & Zcilcr, supra note 3.
1 P. Pleasence, "Trials and Tribulations: Conducting Randomized Experiments in a Socio-legal Setting"
2008) 35 J J & Soc'y 8.
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accountability framework. The consultation plan must describe whether and how the
tribunal will consult with the public when it is considering changes to its rules or
policies. The service standard policy must set out the standards of service that the
tribunal intends to provide and a process for making, reviewing and responding to
complaints about the tribunal's service. The member accountability framework must
contain a description of the functions of the members of the tribunal and a
description of the skills, knowledge, experience, other attributes and specific
qualifications required of a person to be appointed as a member of the tribunal. A
code of conduct must also be established for the members of the tribunal. Finally,
the Act also requires adjudicative tribunals to prepare governance accountability
documents, including a memorandum of understanding, a business plan and an
annual report. While these "public accountability documents" do not necessary
provide the data necessary to conduct a complete evaluation of a tribunal, they help
foster a culture of evaluation through tracking data, identifying benchmarks and
engaging in strategic planning.
In order to determine the data which will be helpful in evaluating tribunals such as
HPARB and HSARB, potential evaluators must also thoughtfully consider both the
target audience of their research and the overall goal that their particular health-
related adjudicative tribunal is expected to help achieve, and then identify the most
important targeted outcomes that are relevant to the audience and important for the
goal's fulfillment.72 When such outcomes cannot directly be measured, as may often
be the case, evaluators must identify strong surrogate endpoints which are
measurements that reflect important outcomes even if they are of indirect or
diminished practical importance. Performance indicators can then be developed
followed by the corresponding methodologies for tracking changes to them.
In the case of Ontario's health-related adjudicative tribunals, both HPARB and
HSARB may describe their overall goal as contributing to the health of Ontarians by
enhancing decision-making within the health system. If government officials are the
evaluation's intended audience, targeted outcomes could include: (1) confidence in
the health system, (2) equity, justice and fairness in health decision -making, (3)
strengthened health system institutions, and (4) better health services and patient
safety via enhanced regulation and oversight. Since these outcomes would be nearly
impossible to measure directly, surrogate endpoints can be developed and could
possibly include: (1) access to adjudicative mechanisms for dispute resolution, (2)
perceived legitimacy of adjudicative decisions, (3) satisfaction with adjudicative
services, (4) perceived fairness and legitimacy of adjudicative services, (5) changed
conduct of health system institutions and decision-makers, (6) establishment or
expansion of support mechanisms for primary health decision-makers, (7) improved
oversight of primary health decision-makers leading to better health outcomes, (8)
better diagnostic and treatment decisions by primary health decision -makers, and (9)
respect among stakeholders for the tribunal's oversight function. Performance
indicators and their corresponding empirical methodologies could then range from
the public's awareness for the tribunal's existence to the perceived concern among
primary health decision-makers that their decisions will be reversed.
Once a system of empirical observation is in place, potential evaluators can
establish benchmarks according to which they can track and assess performance.
72 S.O. 2009 c.33 schcdule 5.
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Such comparative points of measurement can be drawn from thoughtful
consideration, aspirational goals of leaders, expert judgments on what is possible, data
from similar tribunals in other jurisdictions (i.e., comparative analysis), or previous
empirical observations from the same tribunal (i.e., interrupted time-series analysis.
VII. CONCLUSION
In summary, adjudicative tribunals serve an essential function within the health
sector, yet their contributions and impact on the delivery of health services and
society in general are not usually evaluated empirically. A focus on evaluation may
enhance tribunals' capacity to engage in continuous quality improvement efforts,
enhance the public's confidence, and maximize their societal impact. More broadly, a
focus on empirical evaluation extends the reach of administrative law to the norms
and means of administrative adjudication, and beyond the legal doctrines considered
by tribunals or the courts which supervise them. In our view, understanding the
significance and implications of these doctrines requires situating them in institutional
and policy contexts. For administrative law, in short, it ought to matter whether
administrative justice is or is not being realized.
